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Introduction 
One important reason for the transformation of Western democracies is claimed to be the mediatiza-
tion of politics (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999; Esser 2013). In addition to the fact that the media in-
creasingly become the main source for citizens to learn about politics, media become independent 
from politics and dependent on the market, therefore change their way of political reporting accord-
ing to their own commercialized ‘media logic’ and increasingly put pressure on political actors to 
adapt to this new logic as they strive to find (favorable) media attention and reach their target audi-
ence (Strömbäck 2008). In this context, politics, which citizens mainly experience through the me-
dia, becomes an increasingly competitive contest, where few prominent personalities, their cam-
paign tactics and intense conflicts and negative confrontations take center stage at the expense of 
pluralist, consensus-oriented, substantive debate (Kriesi 2014: 366). This process constitutes a chal-
lenge especially for consensus-oriented democracies with a high degree of power-sharing, like Swit-
zerland (Landerer 2014). 
In a comparative perspective, however, it is unclear to what extent mediatization of politics actually 
takes place in Switzerland, even if one restricts oneself to only one dimension of mediatization, 
namely the change in media coverage about politics. With a focus on differences among countries, 
Switzerland is still considered not a prime example of the mediatization of politics. Scholars point at 
the ongoing high quality of public debate during direct-democratic votes (Marquis et al. 2012; Kriesi 
2012a), for example, or the low level of personalization (Kriesi 2012b). With a focus on differences 
over time, some scholars observe only few indications of growing media logic in political reporting 
in Switzerland (Umbricht and Esser 2014: 12) while others show a marked increase, for example in 
scandals and media hypes (Imhof 2011: 124–42). 
With our paper, we want to fill some of this gap by analyzing media coverage about parliamentary 
and executive elections in Switzerland in a diachronic perspective. We start with the assumption that 
several factors shape elections news coverage. Hopmann et al. (2011), for instance, point at the im-
portance of both ‘political power’ and the ‘media market’ (in the sense of commercialization). On 
one hand, scholars – especially from political science – explain differences in media content by 
stressing the importance of political structures (e.g. the difference between presidential and parlia-
mentary systems, cf. Kriesi 2012b) and actual behavior of political actors (campaign activities by 
political actors; for direct-democratic campaigns cf. Hänggli 2012). Usually, political structures are 
analyzed regarding the ‘real’ power structures, and political behavior regarding the level of conflict 
and confrontation. In both cases, the well-known argument about a ‘structural bias’ in the media 
goes, increasing power and increasing conflict about the ‘real’ problems will trigger more media 
attention because media tend to follow actors and processes that are deemed important (van Dalen 
2012: 34). With this line of reasoning, one might expect the media merely to reflect the effects of 
globalization and Europeanization on multi-level governance structures, which lead to an ‘empow-
erment’ of executive branches at the detriment of Parliament (Kriesi 2014: 364). 
Other scholars on the other hand, however, argue that it is the logic of commercialized news media 
itself which heavily shapes news coverage (Strömbäck and Dimitrova 2011). In this sense, commer-
cialization on the level of media structures (e.g. degree of profit-orientation) has an independent 
impact on media content. In this view, the media increasingly focus on a restricted set of powerful 
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actors because these actors are considered more newsworthy in the sense that they would capture the 
interest of an increasingly volatile audience. Also, by covering only few and powerful actors, the 
media can more easily portray politics as a drama between important protagonists and antagonists 
which, again, will hopefully catch the attention of readers, listeners and viewers. With this line of 
reasoning, one would expect executive elections to be attractive to commercialized media, also 
compared to parliamentary elections with their much wider spectrum of less well-known candidates. 
To test these diverging assumptions, we analyze media attention to all executive elections between 
1960 and 2011. To take into account political factors, we examine whether conflicted and contested 
executive elections increase media attention. To take into account commercialization as a factor, not 
only do we compare media attention to executive elections with that awarded to parliamentary elec-
tions (a type of election less prone to mediatization effects in Switzerland) but we also include three 
different media types which, in general, are very differently shaped by commercialized media logic. 
Obviously, tabloid media are more commercialized than quality media and thus display a higher 
degree of media logic in their political reporting (fög 2014). By setting media attention to executive 
elections in relation to media attention to parliamentary elections, and in relation to the level of con-
flict and the type of media, we try to contribute to what extent we can speak of increasing mediatiza-
tion of politics where commercialized media logic goes hand in hand with political actors adapting 
to this logic. 
We start by discussing the structural antecedents of election news coverage in the Swiss case: politi-
cal factors and the according news factors relevance and conflict on the one hand and the possible 
influence of media types (and the change of media structures) as a structural antecedent on the other 
hand. We then present the hypotheses, discuss the findings and conclude with a brief discussion on 
the state of mediatization in Switzerland. 
 
Political relevance and political conflict as factors for election news coverage in Switzerland 
As described above, election news coverage is shaped by a multitude of factors. Among these, polit-
ical structures and political cultures are considered highly important. Usually, political structures are 
analyzed regarding the ‘real’ power structures, and political cultures regarding the level of conflict 
and confrontation. In both cases, the well-known argument about a ‘structural bias’ in the media 
goes, increasing power and increasing conflict will trigger more media attention because media tend 
to follow actors and processes that are deemed important (van Dalen 2012: 34). 
Political relevance 
One obvious news factor is the importance or ‘political relevance’ of political actors and institutions 
(Wolfsfeld 2011: 9‒11; Tresch 2009: 71). Their decisions have a higher reach, which makes them 
newsworthy (Eilders 2006: 11). This helps explain, among other indicators, why in countries with 
high power concentration news coverage accordingly focuses more on few prominent political ac-
tors (e.g. Presidents, Prime Ministers) than on parties or anonymous collectives. In contrast to ma-
joritarian democracies (cf. Lijphart 1999), consensus democracies such as Switzerland ‘emphasize 
the diffusion of power (power-sharing) through a multiparty government, balance of power between 
the executive and legislative (…)’ (Vatter 2008: 4, our emphasis). In line with these expectations, 
van Dalen (2012) finds a stronger executive dominance in majoritarian Great Britain than in consen-
sus democratic Denmark where, thanks to power-sharing, parliament is deemed relatively important 
and therefore finds substantial media attention. Similarly, Kriesi (2012b) finds a relatively low focus 
on the ‘top 10’ political actors in news coverage before elections in Switzerland compared to majori-
tarian democracies. In short, election news coverage is shaped by the institutional design of the po-
litical system (Kriesi 2012b: 841). 
Most research on election news has taken this line of reasoning seriously – but only insofar as au-
thors conduct comparisons across actor types or across countries, i.e. asking whether large parties 
receive more coverage than small parties (e.g. Norris et al. 1999), incumbents get more attention 
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than challengers (e.g. Hopmann et al. 2011) or whether media in consensus democracies focus less 
on persons than media in majoritarian system (e.g. Kriesi 2012b). Surprisingly, scholars have hardly 
been interested in comparing different types of elections, and when comparing elections news cover-
age across countries, they do not always justify why, for instance, they compare presidential elec-
tions (and not parliamentary elections) in country X with parliamentary elections in country Y (cf. 
Strömbäck and Dimitrova 2011). The high personalization observed for US politics, for example, 
might also stem from the fact that scholars mainly examine presidential elections; a benchmark such 
as the House elections is usually missing. This lack of research is unfortunate because government 
and parliament are said to have different news values in general. The work of the executive with the 
execution of policy proposals is perceived to have a more direct impact on people’s lives than politi-
cal debates in parliament and is thus more relevant to cover (van Dalen 2012: 35). 
In this light, experts on Switzerland’s political system give only inconclusive evaluations whether 
the executive has become more important over time. On one hand, parliament has actually increased 
its power in the last decades in terms of constitutional mandates. Also, Sciarini (2014) sees an 
‘emancipation’ of parliament as the pre-parliamentary phase dominated by interest groups loses in 
importance at the benefit of the parliamentary phase dominated by (government) parties; when judg-
ing the reputational power, surveyed political actors consider the Federal Council to be very im-
portant, but with no changes between the 1970s and the 2000s (123‒124). On the other hand, par-
liament has lost some of its power to the executive in the last few decades, also because of a lack of 
resources and only low degrees of professionalization (Kriesi 2001). In sum, Vatter (2008: 27) ar-
gues that the Swiss political system has become ‘slightly more majoritarian’ in the last few decades 
(our emphasis), with power-sharing decreasing at the benefit of the executive. Thus, the media pos-
sibly focus more on the executive for its increasing relevance, but the rather limited extent of this 
process that Vatter describes does not suggest that media reporting would have to increase substan-
tially. Should the media begin to focus much more on the executive, one would have to explain this 
with other factors, one of which is political conflict.  
 
Political conflict 
Conflict is an important news factor (Eilders 2006). The more contested and the more controversial 
elections are, the more the media have reasons to cover them. Conflicts are ‘relevant’ if more and 
more (powerful) political actors are involved, increasing the scope of this problem and the stakes of 
the actors involved. 
On one hand, stressing the stable nature of the overall architecture of Switzerland’s political system, 
authors consider Switzerland still a ‘normal’ case of consensus democracy (Vatter 2008), where 
consensus-oriented corporatism still dominates (Armingeon 2011). In the case of parliamentary elec-
tions, competition in a fragmented multi-party system has not fundamentally changed, with the 
number of competing parties staying around the same in the last decades (Vatter 2008: 7‒8). Also, 
with a multi-party government and the mechanisms of direct democracy, parliamentary and execu-
tive elections do not lead to fundamental power shifts. In this sense of relatively low impact, these 
elections lack a high level of conflict and relevance. 
On the other hand, there are good reasons to assume that both parliamentary and executive elections 
have become more conflicted and contested in the last decades. Indications of this are, first, the end 
of the ‘magic formula’ in 2003 and the ongoing discussion about representation in government, sec-
ond, the change of the party system with the rise of the transformed right-wing populist Swiss Peo-
ple’s Party SVP in the 1990s and early 2000s and its contribution to the polarization of the political 
contest, third – and also related to the SVP’s rise – a general increase of conflict among powerful 
actors such as ‘the replacement of corporatist arrangements in the preparatory phase by confronta-
tional politics in Parliament’ (Sciarini 2014: 128), and fourth, the increase of political marketing by 
political parties, seen in a growth of political advertising before elections. At the latest elections in 
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2011, parties invested 18% more in political ads than four years before (Hermann 2012). All in all, 
we conclude that the overall level of conflict might still not be very high compared to other countries 
but it certainly and markedly has increased in the last decades. 
 
Commercialization as a driving force in election news coverage in Switzerland 
While there is good reason to assume an importance of these factors (political relevance, conflict) 
for the amount of media attention to elections, two problems remain. First, executive elections as 
such might not only load on the news factor ‘relevance’ but on the news factor ‘prominence’. Sec-
ond, while a mere portrayal of conflicts might mirror their relevance, a dramatization of conflict 
focusing on confrontation rather than on compromise does not. Both indicators, a focus on promi-
nent figures and a dramatization of conflict, are more closely in line with the process of commercial-
ization (Mazzoleni 2008a). 
Switzerland’s media system has been affected by commercialization comparatively late, but then 
with rapid and dramatic intensity. An empirical analysis of media structures between 1960 to 2011 
confirms that the disappearance of papers with strong ties to parties and other intermediary actors 
(Udris and Lucht 2014), the growing press concentration on few commercialized media organiza-
tions and the growing importance of commercialized tabloid and ‘free’ commuter papers progressed 
in ‘liberal’ countries first (e.g. United States, United Kingdom) (Hallin and Mancini 2004) and only 
later in ‘democratic-corporatist’ countries (e.g. Germany, Austria, Switzerland). Interestingly, Swit-
zerland even within the democratic-corporatist group of countries is a ‘late starter’ but, for instance, 
now shows a higher press concentration than in UK’s highly commercialized media system (Lucht 
and Udris 2013). True, the extent of deregulation in the broadcasting sector (e.g. allowing private 
broadcasters to apply for licences) is limited in Switzerland’s small media market, with even small 
regional broadcasters receiving around half of their income through public licence fees. But in the 
press and online sector, the markedly sinking advertising revenue since the 2000s and the establish-
ment of a ‘free lunch’ culture among media consumers (cost-free information through free commut-
er papers, now the largest newspapers in Switzerland, and through newspaper internet sites) means 
sinking resources for (expensive) quality journalism and a rapid growth in use of lower-quality me-
dia (fög 2014). On the meso level of news organizations, commercialization over time affects organ-
izations with strong ties to parties and intermediary actors, who either went out of business or loos-
ened these ties. The NZZ Gruppe, for instance, in the late 1990s loosened its restrictions to acquire 
its shares; membership in the FDP was no longer required. Other large media organizations turned 
into highly diversified media corporations, where the actual production of news is only one part of 
the business next to event-marketing (e.g. Ringier), or they became listed on the stock market (e.g. 
Tamedia in the 1990s). As we know from the literature, market-listed media organizations experi-
ence higher shareholder pressures and are more highly profit-driven than other types of media or-
ganizations (McMenamin et al. 2012; Benson and Hallin 2007: 28); this stands in tandem with 
commercialized media logic.  
With this differentiation from politics and de-differentiation from the market, the media have devel-
oped a new ‘media logic’, which means they increasingly operate according to their own logic inde-
pendent from ‘political logic’ (Mazzoleni 2008a). In its most basic form, the commercialization of 
the media is reflected content-wise in a growing focus on ‘soft news’ instead of ‘hard news’ 
(Reinemann et al. 2012; Curran et al. 2010: 7‒9), as the media hold this a viable and promising 
strategy to capture the attention of an increasingly volatile audience. ‘Soft news’ coverage means 
that politics as ‘hard news’ topics as such are covered less frequently than before – and only if they 
fulfill the media logic. As for elections news coverage, scholars dealing with the ‘framing’ of poli-
tics (de Vreese 2012: 368) suggest that the ‘game frame’, i.e. portraying politics as a ‘game’ or a 
‘horse race’ with winners and losers, is a result of commercialization (Aalberg 2012; Strömbäck and 
van Aelst 2010). Media logic means a dramatization of conflict, not just the mere description of 
relevant conflicts. Second, commercialized media focus less on ideas and more on persons, prefera-
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bly prominent figures. As the media attribute responsibility for moral and political failures and 
grievances to clear and visible politicians as individuals and tend to downplay the structural bases of 
political problems, reducing the complexity of politics, this ‘media populism’ (Mazzoleni 2008b) 
better serves to connect to the audience (Blumler and Kavanagh 1999: 219‒221).  
Against this backdrop, executive elections are expected to be more attractive to the media than par-
liamentary elections (cf. Udris 2012): executive elections include a much more limited set of actors, 
and they often include prominent politicians, while elections to parliament, where seats are awarded 
per electoral district, include a regionally fragmented set of several thousand candidates, most of 
which less or hardly known to the media, if at all to the wider public. 
Methodologically, the challenge now is to disentangle the causal factors we explained above. All 
factors – relevance, conflict, commercialization – suggest that the media increasingly focus on the 
executive over time. One way of tackling this issue is by treating commercialization not only as a 
process but as state which shows itself differently in different media. The argument then goes that, 
once we have established that a news outlet in general, meaning not only in election periods, shows 
more signs of commercialized media logic (e.g. more personalization, more sensationalism, etc.), 
and if it turns out that it also focuses more on executive elections than on parliamentary elections 
and more so than a news outlet generally less shaped by commercial pressures, this is most likely an 
indication that this commercialized news outlet does this because it considers executive elections to 
be especially attractive. 
In order to help find out which news outlets in general could be considered more commercialized 
than others, we rely on the concept of media types as antecedents of election news coverage 
(Strömbäck and van Aelst 2010). Media types can be considered groups of outlets that take a distinct 
position in the journalistic field (Benson 2004): they share certain characteristics such as similar 
audience in terms of education, age, etc., business models (e.g. more or less reliance on advertising), 
political or legal frameworks (e.g. public broadcasting with an official mandate, supported by li-
cence fees), organizational cultures or news content (e.g. more or less focus on ‘hard news’). In the 
press market, this leads to a distinction between subscription papers, tabloids, and free commuter 
papers. As for business models, especially regular daily papers rely on a stable audience: around 
90% of their circulation comes from subscribers,1 whereas tabloids rely much more on street sales 
(only around 50% come from regular subscribers); commuter papers completely rely on advertising. 
This daily fight for a volatile audience puts tabloids and free papers under more commercial pres-
sures as their more serious daily counterparts. Like in most Western press markets, subscription 
papers again can be divided into two groups, ‘quality’ and ‘mid-market’ papers. 
The fact that different media types are really differently shaped by commercial media logic is sub-
stantiated by empirical findings on actual media content. In the Swiss case, large-scale studies show 
remarkable differences not mainly between media channels but between media types. For example, 
in the press sector, the share of attention to soft news topics such as sports or human interest com-
pared to hard news topics (politics, economy, culture) is highest in the free dailies and the tabloid 
dailies and lowest in daily subscription papers (fög 2014: 91). As expected, the ‘quality’ paper NZZ 
devotes more attention to hard news both in its editions and on its front page than the ‘mid-market’ 
paper Tages-Anzeiger (fög 2014: 129‒134). 
Bearing in mind these characteristics of media types, one would expect substantial differences also 
in the kind of elections news coverage. Put another way: Should the attention to executive elections 
be higher in more commercialized media types (e.g. the tabloids) than in less commercialized types 
(e.g. quality papers), this would be an indication that executive elections fit the media logic best.  
 
                                                 
 
1 Circulation rates come from the Swiss institution WEMF (numbers are for the year 2012). 
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Hypotheses 
As a starting point, we conduct a comparison between two different types of elections over time. 
The attention in the media to national executive elections is compared with the attention to national 
parliamentary elections. In a general perspective, the factors of commercialization, the slightly 
growing importance of the executive (relevance), and the growing conflict intensity concerning rep-
resentation in government (conflict) together lead us to expect that the media will increasingly cover 
executive elections. We therefore postulate our first hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Over time, media devote increasing attention to executive elections, also in 
comparison to parliamentary elections. 
In a second step, we turn our focus to the characteristics of the various executive elections, especial-
ly the level of conflict. Conflict as a news factor is expected to increase media attention. The level of 
contestation varies for each election and depends also on situational factors, but generally over time, 
conflict about the representation in government has intensified, in particular concerning the repre-
sentation of women in the 1980s and concerning parties in the 2000s, which in 2003 led to the ‘end 
of the magic formula’.  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The more contested an executive election, the higher the media attention. 
To determine whether we could interpret conflict and contestation as an indicator of commercializa-
tion (instead of political relevance), we check to what extent the three media types differ in media 
attention to these elections. In their general reporting, quality papers in particular and to a lesser 
degree mid-market papers display fewer features of commercial media logic than tabloid papers. 
Since we consider executive elections – and especially contested executive elections – to especially 
fit the commercialized media logic (better than parliamentary elections), we formulate our next hy-
pothesis. 
Hypothesis 3a (H3a): The attention to executive elections is highest in the tabloid paper and 
lowest in the quality paper, with the mid-market paper falling in between. 
Since commercialization is seen as a process, tabloids are expected to increasingly focus on execu-
tive elections first. But with increasing commercial pressure, the quality papers and especially the 
mid-market papers are expected to catch up and increase their reporting on executive elections. 
Hypothesis 3b (H3b): Over time, first the mid-market paper and then the quality will also in-
crease their attention to executive elections and begin to close the gap between the tabloid 
paper. 
 
Data and method 
In a diachronic analysis, we focus on the salience of election news coverage over the last fifty years, 
starting with 1960 and thus a period with the beginning of the ‘magic formula’. We distinguish be-
tween news coverage about executive elections (henceforth EE) and parliamentary elections as a 
benchmark (henceforth PE). We focus on newspapers because the press along with television was 
and still is the dominant media sector in Switzerland. The media sample consists of newspapers 
shaped differently by media logic, i.e. a tabloid (Blick), a ‘mid-market’ paper (Tages-Anzeiger) and 
a ‘quality’ paper (Neue Zürcher Zeitung).  
To determine media attention to elections, we rely on an existing, ongoing database of media agen-
das where the most salient ‘communication events’ or ‘issues’ in several Swiss newspapers since 
1910 have been captured (Imhof 1993; Eisenegger 2005; fög 2014: 243). In each newspaper edition 
for each day of a calendar year, researchers have been assigning each article with a minimal size 
(20% of a newspaper page) in all sections (with the exception of the sports section) to a communica-
tion event. A communication event ‘Six-day war’ in 1967, for instance, includes all articles focusing 
on this war in the Middle East, whereas the communication event ‘Parliamentary elections 1967’ 
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includes all articles focusing on candidates, opinion polls, comments on election issues, and all arti-
cles where policy issues are described as part of a discussion in the context of the upcoming elec-
tions.2  
For each newspaper and each year, the database finally includes and describes the twenty largest 
communication events (i.e. those with most articles). Between 1960 and 2011, the period we ana-
lyze, there are thus 3120 outlet-specific communication events, i.e. 1040 per newspaper. To deter-
mine the importance a newspaper awards to a communication event, one can measure its attention 
share by comparing it to the overall attention to all 20 issues on the top agenda. For instance, in the 
tabloid paper Blick, the executive election in 2009 for the vacant seat of Pascal Couchepin was 
ranked number seven on Blick’s agenda. Out of the overall news hole of Blick that year (i.e. the 20 
largest communication events), the attention share of executive elections was 6.7% (43 articles out 
of 645).  
Out of 13 PE and 34 EE that actually took place between 1960 and 2011, we found 91 cases when 
media put an election on their media agenda (top 20) out of the maximum of 141 cases, if each of 
the three newspapers had covered each of the 47 elections. These 91 cases amount to 5’498 articles 
total. For each of the 91 cases, we look at the media attention share of an election within a newspa-
per’s media agenda during a full calendar year. In 50 cases, an election did not find enough media 
attention to be included in the top 20 agenda that year. In these 50 cases, we use a value of ‘0’ for 
media attention share. 
To take into account the level of conflict and contestation about an executive election, we use three 
indicators: first, replacement elections (instead of regular ‘confirmation’ elections, because incum-
bent office-holders would normally not be challenged), second the contestation of official party can-
didates – with the contestation about female candidates as a subtype of this candidate contestation -, 
and third, as the hardest of the three indicators, the contestation of seats by an established govern-
ment party. For the indicators, we rely on official information about actual vote behavior in parlia-
ment (parliamentary bulletin) since we cannot evaluate the universe of various party actors’ state-
ments regarding candidates outside of the public election debate in parliament (e.g. media inter-
views, regional party conventions, ‘back-stage’ of politics such as lobbying, etc.). In the case of 
contestation of candidates, we argue that 50 votes for candidates other than the elected candidate 
indicate a relatively high level of contestation. For example, in 1987, Adolf Ogi (SVP) was elected 
with 132 votes to replace Leon Schlumpf (SVP), but his candidacy was contested (the seat of the 
SVP was not): his competitor from the same party, Hans-Rudolf Nebiker, received 69 votes. 
 
Results 
We now look at media attention of executive elections (EE) from 1960 to 2011 in three German-
speaking newspapers, using media attention to parliamentary elections (PE) as a benchmark. In the 
following figure, we display in columns average values of media attention, taking into account me-
dia attention values of the three different newspapers. The periodization was done also to keep the 
ratio between the actual number of EE and PE relatively constant. Changes in media attention were 
analyzed with the Mann-Whitney U test for significance, as the variable does not show a normal 
distribution (in one third of the cases, an election did not make it to the top agenda). 
Figure 1 shows that PE generate more media attention than EE in all three periods. To explain this 
high attention, one could argue that the ‘input’ for journalists is higher before PE than before EE, 
simply because more parties and more candidates are involved. Also, one could claim that journal-
ists are acutely aware of their normative obligation to cover PE and offer a forum for actors and 
                                                 
 
2 The ongoing assignment of articles to communication events yields satisfactory results regarding intercoder 
reliability (example for 2011, the year with the most recent data: Holsti .83). 
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issues before PE so voters can make up their mind (van Aelst and de Swert, 2009). Over time, there 
is no significant change in media attention to PE. A newspaper on average devotes around 12 per 
cent of its yearly news hole to PE, and PE usually rank among the five largest communication 
events in a year. (In 14 out of the maximum 39 cases, they even constitute the largest communica-
tion event that year.) Thus, one can safely say that PE still become news, as there is hardly any vari-
ation across these three phases. However, there is considerable variation in media attention within 
these phases, with some elections receiving only around 7% (1963) or 9% (1999) and some up to 
15% (1979) or 17% (2007). This variation is most pronounced in the tabloid and least in the quality 
paper (not displayed). This volatility, especially for the tabloid paper, points to situational factors, 
where the overall context (e.g. important international events) and the type or intensity of political 
campaigns determine the amount of attention that a PE receives in a given year. Another reason we 
do not see a trend over time might be an overlap of two phenomena: the growing polarization of the 
Swiss party system is expected to increase media attention to PE (focus on conflict), while the (per-
ceived) sinking relevance of Parliament decreases media attention. However, this calls for extensive 
research that would analyze for each article whether there is indeed a shift towards more conflict 
framing, if not an increase in dramatized ‘horse race’ reporting. 
While media attention to PE does not increase, executive elections (EE) increasingly are in the spot-
light of the media. Average media attention to EE increases significantly, from 0.4% (first phase: A) 
to 3.6% (second phase: B) and 5.2% (third phase: C). This means that the ‘gap’ in media attention 
between the two types of election begins to close. In the 1960-1970s, the ratio between EE and PE 
was around 1:25; in the 1980-1990s, it was 1:3 and in the most recent phase, it was close to 1:2. In 
this sense, one could speak of a growing importance of the executive in the media compared to par-
liament. We consider H1 to be supported. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
We now attempt to analyze the actual characteristics of each executive election. Our interest lies in 
finding out whether the media report the elections primarily because they are de facto more contest-
ed and therefore more ‘relevant’ (H2). To do so, we work with multivariate linear regression models 
with robust estimations that integrate time periods, the level of conflict and, finally, media types (cf. 
Table 1). 
In model 1, we only include time periods as independent variables, aggregating years into four peri-
ods. Empirically, media attention is low until the end of the 1970s (therefore phase 1: 1960-1979). 
Between 1980 and 2011, we now distinguish three periods. According to Vatter (2014: 531‒534), 
Switzerland’s concordance democracy has changed in the last decades mainly because political 
elites show a sinking level of cooperation in a climate of growing polarization. He determines 1992 
as a turning point in this respect with the mainstream parties’ failure in the vote on the EWR and the 
subsequent transformation of the SVP into a right-wing populist party (Mudde, 2007) and its rise in 
electoral appeal (phase 2: 1980-1991). The SVP’s rise constitutes a major change also in the percep-
tion of elites as regards the perceived reputational power of political actors in Switzerland. The 
Swiss People’s Party, which was not central to the power structure in the early 1970s, has come to 
be perceived as the most important actor of all in the 2000s (Sciarini 2014: 124). Following this line 
of reasoning, we consider 2003 another turning point, the year when the SVP managed to receive a 
second seat in government – the ‘end of the magic formula’ and growing government instability, as 
two incumbent office-holders were not re-elected within a short time (Metzler in 2003, Blocher in 
2007) (cf. Vatter 2014: 519–537) (phase 3: 1992-2002; phase 4: 2003-2011). 
Model 1 (cf. Table 1) shows that in comparison with the first phase, media attention increases espe-
cially in the second phase (+3 PP), more modestly in the third phase (+3.7 PP) and then again mark-
edly in the most recent phase (+5.3 PP). 
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[Table 1 about here] 
 
In model 2, we include indicators of conflict and contestation. To begin with, contestation of EE has 
increased over the years, but with differences in the periods (Table 2). Replacement elections, the 
weakest indicator of contestation, are fairly common in four periods. The contestation about sug-
gested party candidates has increased since the 1980s; since then, it has been part of every single EE. 
As a special case of conflict, it also shows that the conflict about representation of women was an 
issue (only) in the second phase and the third phase. As for the hardest indicator, up to 1991, none of 
the established parties attacked another seat. In the period between 1992 and 2002, 38% were con-
tested; and in the most recent phase, 71% were contested, mostly with involvement of the right-wing 
populist SVP (both active and passive). 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Model 2 in Table 1 clearly shows that these conflict indicators explain much of the media attention. 
Model 2 significantly increases the explanatory power (R2=.455 vs. R2=.356 for model 1). In line 
with this, the EE with most media attention at all is the 2010 election (two replacements, SP seat 
attacked by SVP), followed by the 1993 election (non-election of female candidate) and the 2003 
election (CVP seat attacked by SVP). Among the conflict indicators, especially replacement elec-
tions (compared to regular Gesamterneuerungswahlen) and the conflict about women representation 
trigger media attention. The contestation of candidates as such increases attention but only slightly. 
As for the contestation of seats, the model shows a certain effect. The reason this effect is not 
stronger is the fact that the SVP’s first attack in 1999 does not (yet) lead to large media attention. 
However, all seven elections since 2000, especially when an SVP seat was involved or the SVP 
contested a seat, lead to higher media attention on average than those two elections since 2000 when 
the SVP was hardly involved. This effect also shows in the significant impact of the factor ‘period 
2003-2011’. This suggests that the growing contestation and government instability with the end of 
the ‘magic formula’ is reflected in media content. In this sense, H2 is supported. 
We now turn our attention to the question whether commercialized media devote more attention to 
EE than less commercialized media (H3a). Model 3, which integrates three media types, clearly 
shows the expected results. Overall, the tabloid, which is generally the most commercialized among 
the three newspapers, focuses most on EE, followed by the mid-market paper and then by the quality 
paper, which also in general displays the lowest degree of media logic (cf. also Figure 2).3 The dif-
ference between NZZ and Blick is statistically significant, as is the difference between NZZ and 
Tages-Anzeiger (the difference between Blick and Tages-Anzeiger is not significant but it points in 
the expected direction). The increase of R2 from .455 to .585 shows that the data fit the statistical 
model much better. Commercialized media logic, which is reflected differently in the three media 
types, clearly matters. 
Again, the low attention to EE in the quality paper NZZ is not a result from the paper’s focus on 
international issues, which slightly minimizes the chances for domestic issues, including elections, 
to be listed on the top 20 agenda. This becomes clear when we compare media attention between the 
two types of domestic elections. In the quality paper, EE (1.4%) are covered around ten times less 
                                                 
 
3 This does not say that the NZZ in absolute terms (number of articles) covers EE less than the other two pa-
pers, but it means that the newspaper deems other issues (e.g. policy issues) more important by setting those 
issues on its top agenda. 
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than PE (10.7%). In the mid-market paper, EE (3.1%) are covered around five times less than PE 
(14.5%), and in the tabloid, EE (4.5%) receive already half as much attention as do PE (9.4%) (not 
displayed). Thus, it is safe to conclude that commercialized news logic goes hand in hand with a 
focus on executive elections. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
As for the process of commercialization (H3b), Figure 2 underlines that a) all papers increasingly 
focus on EE over time and b) the increasing focus on EE starts earliest in the tabloid and latest in the 
quality paper NZZ. The tabloid, which in the first phase starts on a higher level than the other papers, 
increases its media attention mainly from the first to the second phase (statistically significant), more 
so than the mid-market paper does (also statistically significant). The quality paper, however, seems 
to be reluctant even in the 1980s to devote much attention to EE (no significant change). Again, it 
seems implausible to argue that the quality paper, which has been covering ‘hard news’ politics in-
tensively and extensively, simply missed out the ‘real’ relevance of EE in the 1980s. (One alterna-
tive explanation is the quality paper’s elite-orientation that favors the status quo; in that logic, we 
know from the literature on media populism and political populism (Mazzoleni 2008b), challengers 
are considered populist and therefore not worthy to be given equal treatment as the more serious 
contenders.) It is only in the 1990 and especially in the most recent phase that the quality paper sub-
stantially increases its executive election coverage, narrowing the gap to the other two newspapers. 
Thus, H3b is supported. Furthermore, in line with H3a, the quality paper still consistently shows 
lower average values than the relatively more commercialized papers.  
Let us conclude with an example that shows how extensively commercialized media, and especially 
after the end of the magic formula, deal with executive elections. We take two elections from two 
different periods whose level of conflict was more or less the same (measured by our indicators). In 
1966, an election was held to replace Paul Chaudet (FDP), and in 2006 to replace Josef Deiss 
(CVP). In both cases, the candidate selection was contested but not the seat as such. In both cases, 
this was the first election after an ‘extraordinary’ event (1966: resignation of Chaudet after public 
pressure in the ‘Mirage affair’; 2006: first election since the end of the magic formula in 2003). 
However, the 1966 election generated considerably less attention (not a top 20 issue in any of the 
three newspapers) than the 2006 election (average: 2.8%; as expected, media types matter: Blick 
5.1%, TA 3.4%, NZZ not top 20 issue). Obviously, in this most recent phase, EE have become the 
focus of the media even in cases where conflict intensity is actually quite low (of course, attention is 
still even higher in cases of contested elections). For commercialized media, not only the possibility 
to dramatize conflicts but also the news factor prominence seem to play a role. Given these findings, 
we assume that executive elections will keep their important place high on the media agenda and 
shape elections campaigns in the years to come. 
 
Conclusion 
Our empirical analysis showed that in Switzerland, over time, executive elections have gained more 
and more media attention, also in direct comparison with elections to parliament. There are reasons 
to see this increase as a result of changing political structures (Vatter 2008), with the executive be-
coming more important and thus the media covering it more for its increasing relevance (Kriesi 
2012b; Wolfsfeld 2011). Also, our study suggests that highly contested executive elections trigger 
more media attention than those elections which are not, and empirically these contested elections 
increase over time. With media coverage reflecting these patterns, our data is another clear indica-
tion for the increasing level of conflict in Swiss politics. 
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However, our diachronic comparative analysis showed that political factors are only one part of the 
story. Commercialization of the media is an important driving force. The most commercialized tab-
loid paper examined in this paper is the one where this ‘executive dominance’ (van Dalen 2012) is 
most visible in comparison with two less commercialized papers. Over time, executive elections 
trigger large media attention first in the tabloid, then in the ‘mid-market’ paper and only more re-
cently in the ‘quality’ paper. This pattern suggests that the growing attention to executive elections 
is more than just a reaction to a growing ‘relevance’ of the executive or an increasing contestation 
about representation in the executive. The mass media focus on executive elections also because this 
type of elections arguably better fits the commercialized media logic than parliamentary elections, as 
the media can focus on a limited set of well-known candidates (personalization, prominent actors), 
which fight for a maximum number of seven seats, and focus on the political drama. In this sense, 
parliamentary elections, despite their importance for a democratic society, lose visibility at the bene-
fit of the executive. Given these findings, we can speak of an increasing personalization and ‘presi-
dentialization’ and ‘de-parliamentarization’ of political communication in Switzerland. 
We have shown that media types clearly matter as antecedents for news coverage during election 
periods: structures specific to a media type (e.g. business model, which also connects to the level of 
commercialization) are reflected in media content. It is therefore worth using media types in com-
parative research more explicitly and more systematically. Of course, our results cannot be strictly 
generalized beyond the Swiss case. But the importance of media types and the different effects in 
different periods over time shows that it is worth considering these factors in countries with a simi-
larly late but rapid transformation of the media sector, such as Austria or the Netherlands. In Austria, 
scholars point at the successful ‘interplay’ of media populism (mainly the tabloids) and political 
populism (mainly the FPÖ) (Art 2007; Plasser 2003). In the Netherlands, this effect is possibly re-
stricted to certain period of time or certain elections, for instance the 2002 elections with the ex-
traordinary media attention to Pim Fortuyn, when “political relations … suddenly spiraled out of 
equilibrium” (Koopmans and Muis 2009: 660). More recently, the level of populism in the media 
has been on the decline (Bos and Brants: 2014). 
That said, as regards the thesis of the mediatization of politics and the disentanglement of its various 
dimensions (e.g. media content, adaptation by political actors) (Strömbäck 2008), we cannot resolve 
the famous ‘chicken and egg’ question with our design. There are indications that media coverage 
reflects increasing political activities (growing contestation) but at the same time, the consistently 
high attention to executive elections in the tabloid points at the importance of commercialized media 
logic as an ‘opportunity structure’ for political actors. This opportunity structure has been markedly 
changing, with commercialized media logic not only increasing within certain media types but espe-
cially on the level of the overall media system. The audience of quality and mid-market media be-
comes smaller compared to that of tabloid media. This is aggravated by the rise of cost-free com-
muter papers, which within a decade have become the largest newspapers in Switzerland. According 
to data available for the latest election year (2011), which includes media coverage on front pages, 
not only do cost-free papers display a tabloid-like news content in general but, like tabloid papers 
and unlike daily subscription papers, they devote more attention to executive elections than to par-
liamentary elections (fög 2012: 148). Taken together, this development has arguably been giving 
incentives to political actors to contest candidates and seats in executive elections, as this would give 
them high (and free) publicity.  
One avenue for election (news) research then would be to collect more material from the supply side 
of politics, e.g. documents displaying the degree of inner-party conflicts before elections, in-depth 
surveys with political representatives etc. to ask to what extent political actors in Switzerland ‘go 
public’ and intensify their campaign activities also before executive elections. Also, we suggest 
more fine-grained media content analyses which not only take into account our prime indicator (me-
dia attention) but which capture news characteristics for each article and on the level of claims-
making. Needless to say, should these results then show that a mediatization of politics not only 
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affects the behavior of individual political actors and political parties but the overall political institu-
tional field, they would contribute to a much wider debate on how rational, substantial decision-
making processes can be conducted in an era of mediatized politics. 
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Table 1: Explanatory factors for media attention to executive elections 
B SE B SE B SE
time period 1960-1979
period 1980-1991 0.030 *** 0.0088 0.008 0.0111 0.008 0.0111
period 1992-2002 0.037 *** 0.0103 0.019 0.0121 0.019 0.0121
period 2003-2011 0.053 *** 0.0075 0.037 ** 0.0119 0.037 ** 0.0119
political conflict replacement 0.016 ** 0.0055 0.016 ** 0.0055
women 0.022 * 0.0088 0.022 * 0.0088
seat (contested by established parties) 0.012 0.0102 0.012 0.0102
candidate selection 0.006 0.0065 0.006 0.0065
media outlet Blick (tabloid)
Tages-Anzeiger (mid-market) -0.013 *** 0.0039
NZZ (quality) -0.031 *** 0.0057
Constant 0.004 0.0026 -0.008 0.0045 0.006 0.0055
R²
Adjusted R²
Dependent variable: attention share (number of articles) within top 20 communication events per outlet and year
* p < 0.05
** p < 0.01
*** p < 0.001
0.336 0.414 0.545
0.356 0.455 0.585
Reference Reference Reference
Reference
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
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Table 2: Executive elections: level of contestation 
all executive 
elections
period 1960-1979 8 67% 4 33% 0 0% 0 0% 12
period 1980-1991 7 100% 7 100% 4 57% 0 0% 7
period 1992-2002 6 75% 8 100% 3 38% 3 38% 8
period 2003-2011 5 71% 7 100% 1 14% 5 71% 7
total 26 76% 26 76% 8 24% 8 24% 34
replacement women
seat (contested by 
established parties)
candidate selection
 
 
 
